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Abstract This study offers an estimate of Portuguese income inequality over a
period of more than 200 years. It is presented in three widely spaced benchmarks:
1565, 1700 and 1770. This entirely new index is based in large measure on a little-
researched annual personal income tax (de´cima) instituted in 1641. It covered all
social classes, including nobility and clergy and every form of household earnings,
and permits therefore a singularly accurate measure. It allows us to conclude that, in
contrast with early modern Europe in general, Portugal experienced a notable de-
cline in economic inequality. Several freshly minted quantitative indicators enable
us to conclude that the burden of the explanation for this apparently ‘deviant’
behaviour can be ascribed to changes in the functional distribution of income.
Significant transformations in Portuguese agriculture—towards labour-intensive
products like maize and wine—permanently shifted the wage–rental ratio in favour
of labour. The skill premium fell but its contribution was relatively modest. It was a
time of sustained economic growth, but this was not associated with pronounced
urbanization or industrialization.
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1 Introduction
Economic inequality in early modern Europe has attracted a considerable amount of
attention in the last twenty years or so. This rise to prominence has occurred
concurrently with another important wave of scholarly endeavour dealing with the
long-run macroeconomic performance of nations. Both literatures are quantitative,
require a substantial data gathering effort and use economic tools of analysis.
Together, they represent a major new approach to our understanding in the past of
the two most important issues of our time: economic growth and how its results are
distributed. Yet, to date they have not developed much in terms of the historical
relations between them. The present paper belongs in the second of these fields of
inquiry but takes advantage of progress in the first.
A vigorous data-mining effort conducted during these two decades has
encompassed many configurations—countries, regions, cities, towns, villages and
rural spaces—and stretched across smaller or larger parts of the three centuries
considered. This accumulation of findings has motivated retroactive estimations
comparing the earlier modern era with the present. Others have traced the causes of
present-day inequality, including in former colonial territories all the way back to
the historical experience of their former European masters.1
Of particular significance are two influential papers that have shaped the debate
concerning the evolution of inequality over long periods. One of these—van Zanden
(1995)—gets its inspiration from Kuznets’ famous inverted U-shaped curve
representing economic inequality during the era of modern economic growth.
Early modern growth in dynamic countries like Holland and England was probably
driven by similar mechanisms and caused a sustained rise in income disparity. This
was overlaid by shifts in the functional division of income caused also by economic
development and with similar effects.
A second path-breaking approach came some years later. Major contributions by
Williamson (2009) and Milanovic et al. (2011) suggested that the degree of
economic inequality at any point in time and space was not only positively
correlated with its level of per capita income. It was also connected with the varying
ability of elites to extract resources from the above-subsistence surplus produced by
the community. For this, they used a variety of political and economic means at
their disposal. The importance of this contribution is that variation in inequality thus
ceased to be understood as mainly endogenous to growth, as in Van Zanden’s work
(1995), and could now be understood also as dependent on the exogenous impact of
power and institutions on distribution.
Notwithstanding the treasure trove of data and ideas for understanding them,
progress in the analysis of economic inequality has not been as great as one might
have expected. There are two problematic areas here. One is that consistent ‘country
studies’ covering long periods of time—as Kuznets presumed for his model—
remain scarce. Moreover, they often lack the macroeconomic indicators needed for
testing the application of theory to history. This is particularly so with the numerous
microeconomic studies in this field. The other is that, although the proxies employed
1 A classic work on this problematic is Engerman and Sokoloff (1997).
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to estimate wealth or income disparity are abundant, the measures for them are not
always sufficiently homogeneous in conceptual, methodological and empirical
terms. This makes it difficult to establish valid cross-country, inter-temporal
comparisons in this field.
This paper presents a case study of income disparity in Portugal from the mid-
sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries. It is based on a sizeable body of largely
unexplored fiscal data, which provides a considerable amount of detail on income
drawn from personal tax rolls. It also assures a wide coverage of the country. This
allows us to establish a reasonably accurate national account of inequality, as
opposed to the local or regional inequality estimates more commonly seen in this
context. Estimates of income inequality are undertaken for three benchmarks—
1565, 1700 and 1770. Portugal is of interest for other reasons, however. From the
present point of view, it is seriously under-studied and constitutes therefore a
relevant gap in the global European picture. Moreover, as recent research has shown
(Palma and Reis 2016), in terms of long-term economic performance, it is neither an
outlier nor a laggard and therefore is reasonably representative of a European
‘norm’.
The present research makes two contributions to the burgeoning literature on
pre-industrial economic inequality. The first is methodological. It shows how a
measure of national inequality can be constructed for a prolonged period by
obtaining Theil indices from a limited set of representative local observations and
then aggregating them. Consistent and reliable results can thus be achieved using
relatively scarce resources. The second is its fresh and challenging results, mainly
that Portugal displayed a persistent decrease in national inequality between the
sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. At a time of mostly positive macroeco-
nomic performance, this would seem to point in the opposite direction to that of
the canonical perspective.
The analysis of this conundrum relies on three ideas, which are not new in the
literature but have led in other cases to different interpretations. The first appeals to
the oft-invoked primacy of variation in the functional distribution of income to
explain changes in economic inequality. The second idea is that the country
recorded substantial growth, but this was accompanied by relatively little structural
change. The impact of urbanization, capital concentration and escalating demand
for skills found, for example, in Holland, was only weakly felt in Portugal. The third
belongs to the realm of political economy. It relates to the significant rise in income
from empire accruing to the crown and to the elites and to the country’s relatively
low military effort in the long run. Any of these factors might have lessened the
need, comparatively, for these extractive groups to pressure the lower economic
strata of Portuguese society.
2 Portugal: a data set and a methodology
Economic inequality in twentieth century Iberia has attracted considerable attention
recently. This is not surprising given the region’s history of political extremes in this
period and the links between political contexts and inequality. In Spain, this interest
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has spilled back in time, and the result is a fairly clear picture for the Early Modern
period too (Santiago-Caballero 2011; Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura
2013; Nicolini and Ramos-Palencia 2016). Recent studies on Portugal have also
placed it on the world’s twentieth century inequality map (Guilera 2010; Lains et al.
2008; Alvaredo 2008), but the same cannot be claimed for earlier periods.
In the earlier, non-quantitative literature, Portuguese was seen as profoundly
unequal, with the vast majority living in abject poverty and a tiny minority of
nobles, high clergy and rich merchants controlling enormous shares of national
income. This was deemed a major barrier to long-term economic growth (Godinho
[1971] 1980). The literature also recognized that these asymmetries were not static
but followed a rough periodization. The pre-1500 period was described as
‘democratic’, with a low degree of inequality. This increased during the sixteenth
century due to imperial expansion and happened again during the eighteenth century
owing to a second burst of colonial enlargement. In between, inequality declined,
thanks to the capacity of the urban bourgeoisie to break the grip of the nobility on
trade (Cortesa˜o 1964; Serra˜o 1969).
None of these interpretations has been supported by either empirical evidence or
the correct analytic tools, nor have they added much to our understanding of
historical distributional issues. The exception is Johnson’s (2002) pioneering work
based on a large collection of evidence from the Middle Ages to 1800.2 Our
research follows Johnson’s footsteps but with three modifications. The first is to set
aside the pre-1500 material and replace part of the later pool of its sources by a
larger and richer body of fiscal data, as yet unexplored.3 The second focuses on
three benchmark years separated by long intervals, rather than attempt something
closer to a time series. We have chosen 1565, in the midst of the first burst of
overseas expansion; 1770, towards the end of Portugal’s second great colonial
cycle; and 1700, an intermediate point in the country’s long-term spurt of economic
growth from 1600 to the 1750s. The third modification concerns the method
whereby the variety of local measurements is pulled together into a single,
representative national metric. The Theil index adopted here, which is not inferior to
the Gini index in other respects, has the advantage of being decomposable.4 It can
thus serve for averaging local estimates in order to obtain a comprehensive
measurement without bias, something that using a Gini would not allow.5
Of the three standard source materials for studying early modern economic
inequality, only one can be used in early modern Portugal.6 Social tables have not
2 Faı´sca and Lopes (2015) are the first since to have introduced a modern approach to this field.
3 This obliges us to incorporate two data sets which are constructed differently: the de´cima tax and the
servic¸o tax of 1565, of which more below. The latter was also used by Johnson (2002).
4 The technical reasons are given in Cowell (2011). Only a few historical inequality studies have
employed Theil indices among them Morrisson and Snyder (2000), Santiago-Caballero (2011) and
Nicolini and Ramos-Palencia (2011). None of them has used this metric, however, in order to estimate a
national index of inequality from a limited collection of data, like here.
5 To permit comparisons with the results of other researchers, below (Table 3) we display the scores for
local inequality estimates both as Ginis and Theils.
6 For a non-Portuguese example of social table-based research, see Williamson (2009). For probate-based
studies, see Cosgel and Ergene (2012) and Canbakal and Filiztekin (2013).
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been found for any year prior to 1800.7 Probate inventories are not scarce, but have
been rarely employed in research, and their dispersion makes them hard to handle.8
The only practical alternative is to resort to the rolls of taxpayers respecting income
or wealth. Fortunately these are not only reasonably abundant but also the best
suited for our objective.
A tax on the total net income of all households only came into force in Portugal
in 1641 under the name of De´cima de Guerra (or de´cima, for short). It can therefore
only serve as a proxy for constructing the 1700 and 1770 benchmarks. Notwith-
standing, its advantages for the present analysis are considerable.9 To begin with, it
was annual and a universal imposition from which neither the nobility nor the
magistracy nor the clergy was exempted.10 Secondly, it proxies one variable
alone—income—and is therefore not contaminated by others, such as wealth or
rent. In the third place, valuations were seriously intended to reflect solely the
ability of each person to contribute and ignored other attributes that are common in
early modern appraisals, like ‘condition, power or honour’ (Hanus 2013). Indeed,
the royal edicts defining how fiscal appraisals should be made never failed to insist
that evaluators ‘keep justice and equity’ and ‘be especially careful in judging the
commercial, business and manufacturing activity of each subject’ (Oliveira 1971,
vol. 1: 308). Finally, the de´cima was not farmed but administered by the crown,
albeit with the help of local officials. As a result, much documentation has survived
and the procedures are nationally homogenous because subjected to hierarchical
supervision by royally appointed officials.
The de´cima was part of the effort to finance the war of independence from Spain
between 1640 and 1668, but ultimately lasted into the nineteenth century.11 It was
due to all forms of personal income: rents from real estate; profits from business,
trade, manufacturing and agriculture; income from all kinds of labour; and interest
7 The earliest known social tables are for the nineteenth century and are, respectively, in Franzini (1843)
and Costa (1851).
8 To date few monographs have relied on probate inventories: examples are an eighteenth century urban
credit study and others concerning nineteenth century landed elites. See Rocha (1991, 1996) and Fonseca
(1996).
9 The legislation on this tax is copious and conveniently compiled in the site http://www.juslusitaniae.
fcsh.unl.pt. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the revenue from it amounted to 11 per cent of
total state income (Costa et al. 2016: 219). The tax rolls used in the present study have been collected, for
the de´cima, from the municipal archives of the localities to which they relate. The remaining ones are in
print and can be found in: Lisbon-1565 (Livro 1947–8); Coimbra-1565, 1599 and 1613 (Oliveira 1971),
Loule´-1564 (Magalha˜es 1970) and Tavira-1699 (Magalha˜es 1993).
10 The exclusion of religious corporations, i.e., regular clergy, from our assessment data does not
necessarily imply any underestimate since it would be the equivalent to not including state corporations in
the calculation of inequality in modern times. The church held out for an exemption of all its members,
including the secular clergy, until the 1760 s, and paid lump sums at times but ultimately had to give in.
See Conde (2002/3). Individual priests, however, are regularly found in all periods on the rolls of tax
payers. In some localities, beggars and others were shown to have no income at all. In such cases, given
that they must have gained a ‘survival income’, we have attributed to them one half of the lowest earnings
from labour shown in the tax roll. According to Tracy (2015: 515), in Europe, from the sixteenth century
on, ‘hitherto exempt clergy and nobles were now for the first time subjected’ to these impositions.
11 There is no major history of Portuguese public finance during the Ancien Regime. Specifically on the
de´cima, see Silva (1987), Magalha˜es (2004) and Costa (2009).
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on loans. In each household, the tax fell on the global net proceeds of as many of
these activities as engaged its members. In the assessment rolls, these different
components are presented separately and totalled under the name of the head of
household. Initially, the rate was a flat, universal 10 per cent of net income. After
1668, it varied between 4.5%, in times of peace, and 10%, in times of war or of the
threat thereof.12
Prior to 1640, direct taxes were raised by Portuguese monarchs at irregular
intervals on the income or wealth of the population and subject to the approval of
the Cortes (parliament). These were extraordinary measures for specific purposes—
war, national celebrations, princely dowries or fiscal consolidation.13 Since the
middle ages, they had been a common feature of fiscal Europe and were generally
charged to heads of households on the basis of their economic capacity to pay. They
might apply to the entire nation, or parts of it, according to their purpose.
The ‘Tax for the Service of His Majesty’ was one of these earlier forms of direct
levy. It was exacted in 1565 and is employed here to enable us to extend the
temporal range of our study back into the sixteenth century. It was a one-off
exercise aimed at obtaining from the country the considerable sum of 40 million
reais. It was applied throughout Portugal using administrative procedures that were
very similar to those later employed when the de´cima was introduced.14 It was
charged to each household at a flat rate of 0.7% of the value of the abode,
irrespective of whether the property was rented or owner-occupied. It thus yields
indirectly an estimation of the rental value of all residences and is therefore a source
for the distribution of rents. In keeping with other recent early modern studies, we
assume it is a reasonable guide for the household income distribution of the places
observed (van Zanden 1995; Ryckbosch 2016; Alfani and Ammannati 2016; Hanus
2013).
At the top of the scale, there was a cap of one million reais on what a real estate
owner would have to pay but all properties had to be valued first and therefore none
should be absent from the listing. At the bottom, all living quarters with rental
values below 2300 reais a year, whatever their resident’s income or form of
employment, were made to pay a fixed sixteen reais. Various privileged social
groups were exempted in full: members of the court nobility, their fathers and
grandfathers; the regular clergy; high magistrates; knights, their widows and their
orphans; doctors in theology; and surgeons (Rodrigues 1970: 100). In the aggregate,
these dispositions involved a downward bias since they would flatten the
distribution both at the top and at the bottom of the register.
How reliable are these taxes for studying economic inequality in this period?
Certainly there were selection biases in both sources. Some of them were expressly
built into the design of the tax system, e.g., exemptions for certain social classes.
Others were the result of individual efforts to evade fiscal obligations altogether or
12 The exact chronology of these oscillations can be found in http://www.iuslusitaniae.fcsh.unl.pt/.
13 The exaction of such levies by the Portuguese kings has been little explored by economic historians.
See, however, Gonc¸alves (1964) and Dominguez (2015).
14 The 1565 tax rolls are a well-known source for historians. They have been used by Rodrigues (1970),
Magalha˜es (1970) and Oliveira (1971). The full text of the Lisbon tax roll has been transcribed in Livro
(1947–8), which also contains the royal edict specifying the rules for its application.
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to reduce the value of family appraisals by falsifying documents and distorting
declarations. Obviously, the difficulty in determining the magnitude of these
deviations is considerable. Some checks on them are possible, however.
Collective tax exemptions would have had the greatest distortive impact on the
assessment schedules. After all, they usually affected social groups at the two ends
of the distribution. In the case of the rich, they represented a large share of total
income. With the poor, it was not their share of income that made the difference to
inequality, but their large numbers. In the case of the Lisbon Servic¸o tax, the two
lowest income classes—the ‘braceiros’ (unskilled manual workers) and ‘others’—
together constituted 39.1% of all the potential taxpayers in the city (Rodrigues 1968:
150). Thus, in a system which taxed wealth and therefore excluded such people
from payment, this would have meant a significant reduction in the inequality
estimate.15
A suggestive yardstick for gauging the distortions caused by exemption and
evasion is the gap between two variables: the total number of households in a
locality—the potential capacity of the fiscal system—and that of those actually
assessed. It is displayed in Table 1, which shows the ratio between these two
magnitudes, along with the time and place of each observation, in the few years
when satisfactory data could be gathered. This is not a perfect indicator because it
compares two counts of different qualities: a frequent household one by tax officials
and a very occasional one, simply of abodes, carried out with haphazard methods.
Table 1 therefore only comprises urban locations since the unreliability of rural
population tallies is difficult to check. Two significant findings emerge nevertheless.
Firstly, avoiding personal taxes does not seem to have been all that easy. Though the
ratio has some variance, it is remarkable how often and how close the size of the two
communities could be. Secondly, the servic¸o tax was clearly less effective than the
de´cima, given its exemptions, and biased results towards a lower-bound estimate of
inequality.16 This demonstrates the superiority, in terms of accuracy of results, of a
system like the de´cima over any real estate or wealth-based method of taxation such
as were common in Europe at this time.
Trying now to judge distortions caused by individual prevaricators is a lot
more challenging and probably quite unfeasible by any direct approach. A
different way is to consider the mechanisms used to assess income tax liability
and thus appraise, impressionistically, how easy it would have been to elude
them. Several features of the de´cima methodology were notably well designed to
dissuade shirking. One aspect was the already noted countrywide homogeneity
of direct tax regulation which stopped cheats from sheltering under excessive
regulatory complexity.17 Another was to make the lists of taxpayers in each
15 Examples of situations where significant segments of the population were left out of the tax rolls, and
the implications arising from this are found in Piedmont and Florence (Alfani 2015; Alfani and
Ammannati 2016); and the Netherlands (Van Zanden 1995; McCants 2007).
16 Faı´sca and Lopes (2015) corroborate this finding for three localities (Arraiolos, Avis and Portalegre) in
the province of Alentejo for the early eighteenth century.
17 Morrisson and Snyder (2000) and Santiago-Caballero (2011) show how in the course of time a simple
set of fiscal arrangements could be transformed into a cumbersome mosaic of fiscal localism, which soon
became fossilized.
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locality coincide with those of parishioners drawn up by local priests in order to
monitor the fulfilment of religious duties. Thirdly, conjoining names and
residences rendered this compilation effort a highly effective instrument for
keeping track of all the other pieces of information needed for estimating
individual fiscal capacity.
The construction of the de´cima database fell to four local wise men appointed by
the municipal council. For each street, two assessors, who were residents in it and
would counter-check each other, were chosen by them to draw up the respective list
of householders, which is to say, of taxpayers. They were expected to be familiar
with the affairs of its inhabitants, in particular their income and possessions. This
operation was overseen by a magistrate without local ties, who was directly
appointed by the crown. A further control was to ensure that assembling taxpayer
lists followed a rigorous geographic criterion. In urban centres, it was done street-
by-street and house-by-house. In the countryside, it was done hamlet-by-hamlet or
farm-by-farm. In either case, the lists were systematically compared with earlier
ones and any gap in the tally had to be justified. As a result, concealing a taxpayer’s
‘absence’ or justifying an erroneous appraisal of his means, which tended to be
known to many, could be risky.18
Even if it was hard to ‘disappear’ from the rolls, did the rich manage to transfer
the fiscal burden onto the shoulders of the poor by tampering with or under-
reporting their assessments? Was this on a scale sufficient to make a difference to a
broad measure of inequality? A simple test is to plot income inequality profiles, i.e.,
the cumulative frequency of individual incomes, at different times and in different
Table 1 Urban households: inhabited versus assessed. Sources: The assessment dates are those in the tax
records, see Table 3; for the number of taxed houses, same source; for the number of total households see
Johnson (2002) for 1565; Costa (1708) for 1690, 1698, 1699 and 1725; and for all late eighteenth-century
dates, Memo´rias Paroquiais, 1758, in Portuguese National Archives
Locality Date of assessment Taxed households Total households Share taxed
Lisboa 1565 15,025 18,000 0.83
Loule´ 1565 694 691 1.00
Portalegre 1725 1488 1530 0.97
Avis 1690 568 600 0.95
Vila do Conde 1698 714 750 0.95
Castro Marim 1699 482 600 0.80
Guarda 1763/1769 820 743 1.10
Viseu 1763 469 529 0.89
Caminha 1767 325 335 0.97
Vila do Conde 1763 706 869 0.81
18 The Regimento da De´cima of 1654 prescribed the following steps for compiling a tax roll: (1) start
with the list of parishioners, and call them in one by one to describe their employment, assets and income
(2) verify this information by questioning other people (3) walk up and down the street to check the
names of the residents and see whether any are missing or whether there are any new ones (4) calculate
the assessments and write them into two copies of the roll, one to be kept locally and the other to be sent
to Lisbon. See http://www.juslusitaniae.fcsh.unl.pt.
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parts of the country.19 To some extent at least this should reveal whether there was
an excessive accumulation of income at the bottom of the distribution, or too little
of it at the top, thus contributing artificially to the high inequality counts which we
obtain in the next section. Figures 1 and 2 provide examples, namely the towns of
Coimbra and Caminha, respectively, in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The
impression given by these two histograms does not diverge from expectation: a long
tail of very poor taxpayers and a short one with a high concentration of wealth or
income in the hands of a tiny share of well off households at the other extreme.20
3 Estimates of income distribution for Portugal
In this section, we estimate a consistent national income inequality index for
Portugal over a significant part of the Early Modern period. The strategy is to
construct a Theil index [GE(1)] for each of our benchmark years. We thereby take
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Fig. 1 Cumulative income distribution, Coimbra, 1567. Sources: see text and Table 3
Fig. 2 Cumulative income
distribution, Caminha 1767.
Sources: see text and Table 3
19 Another, more elaborate method would have involved examining how income was spread out over the
different deciles of the distribution. This is done by Faı´sca and Lopes (2015) for a small sample of
localities and corroborates our graphic findings.
20 Additional histograms for other localities can be obtained on request from the author. For a similar
situation regarding Naples in 1811, see Malanima (2006).
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advantage of the decomposability of this metric but use it inversely to the usual
procedure. Thus, rather than start from an existing national estimate of inequality
and decompose it into sub-indices of inequality, we follow a bottom-up ‘additive
strategy’. This involves grossing up to a national Theil from a collection of Theil
indices corresponding to the different settlement types of the country and weighted
by their respective populations and per capita incomes. The expression used is
T ¼
X
Nj=Nð Þ  ðMj=MÞ  Tj þ
X
Nj=Nð Þ  ðMj=MÞ  ln Mj=Mð Þ ð1Þ
in which T and Tj are the national and the local settlement Theils, respectively; Nj
and N are ‘local’ and national tax-paying population sizes measured by the number
of households, respectively; Mj and M are the respective mean incomes per
household at the settlement and national levels (Sala-i-Martin 2002; Steckel and
Moehling 2001). The last of these is proxied by the tax assessment per household.
Before estimating our results, certain preliminaries need to be worked out. The
first is to develop a grid of population settlement types that capture their
distinctive time-invariant characteristics with regard to economic inequality. This
is a central assumption for structuring this paper. It is inspired by the welter of
early modern local, micro-studies that show stable relations between local
inequality, on the one hand, and a combination of community sizes and economic
specializations on the other hand. Thus, for centuries, rural inequality in Europe
tended to be significantly lower than urban. Within urban communities, their size
tended to be positively correlated with disparity in income or wealth. In eighteenth
century Spain, for example, the larger villages in rural Guadalajara were more
unequal than the smaller ones (Santiago-Caballero 2011). While in Madrid the
Gini for income was 0.77, in Jerez de la Frontera, a small peripheral town, it was
0.50 (Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2007). An additional distinction is
present in the Dutch province of Overijssel in 1750, where prospering towns
showed a higher degree of inequality than did stagnant ones of similar scale. As
Van Zanden (1995: 649) observed, ‘economic development, urbanization and
capital accumulation in the early modern period went hand in hand with an
increase in inequality’.
In this perspective, in Table 2, we use the following four categories: the two
main cities, that is, the capital (Lisbon) and Porto; the urban centres with more than
1000 households; smaller towns than these, with less than 1000 households; and the
countryside proper.21 This enables us to display the total population and the
population shares of these categories at each benchmark and thus supply the values
for Nj and N required for expression (1) above.
A second preparatory step organizes the data of all localities and displays
them in Table 3. This comes to a total of twenty-seven cases, including three
which are not from archival records but inferred indirectly from other sources.
Aside from their respective income Ginis and Theils (the former for the sake of
comparing with studies which do not use Theils), the location and date of each
record, the type of settlement and the number of households in each one are also
shown. In addition, there is a set of dummies for urban centre, coastal town and
21 Van Zanden (1995) follows a similar procedure but employs five categories instead.
J. Reis
123
for seat of national government (Lisbon). As a proxy for per capita income—of
critical importance for the Theil index—we use the weighted mean, within
settlement types, of real household income assessments. The national mean for
this variable is weighted by the respective number of taxed households in each
place.
A third stage in the estimation process seeks to attest the reliability of these
inputs. We start by noting that almost all our local observations are complete. They
are the integral schedule of taxpayers in each locality considered, not a sample from
it.22 We may thus suppose them to be reasonably representative of the distribution
patterns associated with the respective standard settlements across the national
spectrum at each of our benchmarks. Secondly, we consider the possibility of a
geographic selection bias. The different localities we have collected in Table 3
encompass the most significant regional contrasts to have shaped Portuguese social
and economic history during these centuries. The oppositions in question are those
relating to minifundiary versus latifundiary agro-systems, coastal plains versus hilly
interior, pastoralism versus grain production, and shipping and fishing versus rural
communities (Ribeiro 1986).
A further worry is that our data should be plausible in the light of historical
knowledge about early modern Europe, a major feature of which was a marked high
level of inequality compared to present-day standards (McCants 2007). This
concern is readily dispelled by noting the high level of Ginis to be found in Table 3
irrespective of time and place. Out of twenty-four, four were less than 0.5. Of the
remaining twenty, sixteen were between 0.5 and 0.7, and four were above 0.7.23
Another is the descending pattern of inequality relative to the degree of
development of settlements in Portugal at each benchmark from the sixteenth
century onwards. Figure 3 reveals a consistent pattern of the highest Ginis occurring
in principal cities, then falling with the passage to major and then to lesser towns,
Table 2 Population and shares of national population by four types of settlement (1000s of inhabitants).
Sources: Bairoch et al. (1988) and Palma and Reis (2016)
1565 % 1700 % 1770 %
Principal cities 86.0 6.4 205.0 8.9 226.0 7.7
Major towns 94.0 6.9 123.5 5.4 264.0 9.1
Minor towns 45.0 3.4 70.5 3.1 56.0 1.9
Countryside 1125.0 83.3 1901.0 82.6 2366.0 81.3
Total population 1350.0 100.0 2300.0 100.0 2912.0 100.0
Principal cities are Lisbon and Porto; major towns are all other urban centres with more than 1000
households; minor towns are those with less than 1000 households; the countryside is all non-urban
population. Population is in 1000s of inhabitants
22 To arrive at this, we have discarded a number of unsatisfactory tax rolls employed by Johnson (2002).
The main reasons were either a large numbers of fiscal exemptions and exclusions in some pre-de´cima
lists, or a lack of access to the original lists of individual taxpayers. Often Johnson presents the data in an
aggregated form. Owing to difficulties in sampling the national de´cima pool, the contents of which are
widely spread across the country, we chose the localities to which we had easier access.
23 For four entries, data were unavailable for calculating Ginis.
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and, finally, to rural communities, as the lowest. In this optic, Portugal was certainly
not an outlier.
Unfortunately, our data set has three troublesome gaps in it. For lack of certain
tax assessment rolls, we are unable to estimate Theils for Porto in 1565, Lisbon in
1700 and Lisbon in 1770. Given their economic and demographic centrality, it is
important to fill them in. The missing information is interpolated by means of an
Table 3 Inequality indices and summary statistics of localities: 1565, 1700, and 1770. Sources: for
population, Bairoch et al. (1988); for CPI (‘respectable’) and GDP per capita, see Palma and Reis (2016);
for other data, see text
Locality Date CPI
‘respectable’
Real
GDP
pc
Total
HH
Real
tax per
HH
UR Gini Theil Port Govt
Lisboa 1565 100 112 15,014 365 1 0.802 1.448 1 1
Porto* 1565 100 112 3500* 365* 1 – 0.838* 1 0
Coimbra 1567 100 112 1920 390 1 0.692 0.990 0 0
Loule´ 1564 100 112 694 43 1 0.714 1.127 0 0
Loule´ 1564 100 112 507 23 0 0.553 0.538 0 0
Coimbra 1599 100 115 1334 118 1 0.696 1.178 0 0
Coimbra 1613 100 115 1599 427 1 0.698 1.165 0 0
Avis 1690 95 121 311 636 1 0.656 0.829 0 0
Avis 1690 95 121 313 1321 0 0.636 0.791 0 0
Vila do
Conde
1698 95 121 714 305 1 0.583 0.697 1 0
Tavira 1699 95 121 446 1139 1 0.576 0.672 1 0
Arraiolos 1700 95 121 552 456 1 0.650 0.925 0 0
Arraiolos 1700 95 121 374 809 0 0.650 0.760 0 0
Porto 1700 95 121 6000 263 1 0.667 1.022 1 0
Lisbon* 1700 95 121 45,000 263* 1 – 2.901* 1 1
Portalegre 1725 110 150 1279 129 1 0.497 0.743 0 0
Portalegre 1725 110 150 682 72 0 0.472 0.499 0 0
Galveias 1753 106 161 161 145 1 0.636 0.794 0 0
Galveias 1753 106 161 107 2635 0 0.610 0.750 0 0
Guarda 1766 119 151 1042 617 1 0.744 1.362 0 0
Viseu 1763 119 151 469 96 1 0.696 1.018 0 0
Caminha 1767 119 151 2027 40 0 0.483 0.401 1 0
Caminha 1767 119 151 325 39 1 0.585 0.753 1 0
Vila do
Conde
1763 119 151 706 596 1 0.559 0.663 1 0
Vila do
Conde
1763 119 151 125 532 0 0.450 0.320 0 0
Porto 1776 121 150 9000 1274 1 0.700 1.032 1 0
Lisbon* 1776 121 150 47,500 1274* 1 – 3.099* 1 1
HH—households (1000s); UR dummy (urban = 1); port dummy (coastal town dummy = 1); Govt
dummy (seat of government = 1). Interpolated data for inequality are marked with an asterisk
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OLS regression model. In it, the index of inequality is the dependent variable and
the independent variables represent the main determinants of inequality as
suggested by the literature.24 The expression used is
T ¼ aþ b  HH þ c  UR þ d  Port þ e  Tax þ e ð2Þ
in which T is the Theil coefficient for a given locality and date, HH is the number of
households in it which were assessed, UR is a dummy for towns or cities (=1), Port
is a dummy for a port city (=1), Govt is a dummy for the seat of government
(Port = 1), and Tax is the real value of the assessment per household. The error
term is e.
The regression is run without logs, and its output is displayed in Table 4. This
shows a satisfactory fit as well as highly significant coefficients for most of the
independent variables, despite a limited number of degrees of freedom. We are able
to conclude from it that the size of the locality, whether or not it was urban or
coastal, and the amount of tax due per household all raised inequality. Using the
estimated coefficients, we reckon indirectly but with reasonable accuracy the
missing ‘local’ Theils in Table 3. We are thus able to obtain a less biased result for
the final estimation of the national inequality index than would have been possible
otherwise.
With the evidential picture now complete, we move on to calculate, by means of
the ‘short-cut’ methodology described in (1), the values of the Theil index for
Portugal in 1565, 1700 and 1770. The outcome is displayed in Table 5. As noted,
these estimates are subject to a number of caveats connected with the quality of the
data and the methods employed for their collection, as well as by the assumptions
required in order to carry out our research strategy.
The path of income inequality between 1565 and 1700 indicated by these
figures is a fairly steep downward sloping line. It is followed by a gentler upward
gradient in the ensuing seven decades, which does not restore, however, the level of
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Fig. 3 Local inequality in Portugal, 1565–1770 (Theil). Sources: Tables 2 and 3
24 Three recent studies have used this strategy with success, both to fill in information gaps, as we do
here, and in order to model the factors which determine inequality. We use their explanatory variables.
See Malanima (2006); Williamson (2009); and Ryckbosch (2016).
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inequality at the starting point. In the present state of the art, these estimates are
interesting in several ways. The first is that, in terms of early modern European
history, this is quite a lengthy time span (1550–1770) for a national estimate to
cover.25 The second is that it is mainly based on direct evidence on income, an
unusual situation. The third is that it discloses a case, rare in Europe, of a protracted
decline in income inequality during a time when the opposite was the norm.
Although the trend was not persistently of decline, nevertheless, in the course of the
two hundred and twenty years shown here, it demonstrated no tendency to recover
anything like the high disparity level which had characterized the late fifteen
hundreds.
Table 4 Determinants of the
Theil index. Source: Table 3
without interpolated data
HH = total households (1000s);
urban = urban dummy (town/
city = 1); port dummy (coastal
town/city = 1); Govt dummy
(Lisbon = 1); real tax per
HH = real per household tax;
real GDP pc = real gross
domestic product per capita
Linear regressions (OLS)
Dependent variable: local (Theil) income inequality index
Indep. variables Coef. Coef. Coef.
Constant 0.7724*** 0.5372*** 0.8362***
(0.0583) (0.0673) (0.2727)
HH/1000 0.0424*** 0.0499*** 0.0427***
(6.15e-03) (5.32e-03) (0.0121)
Urban – 0.4009*** 0.3936***
(0.0767) (0.0823)
Port – -0.3019*** -0.2791***
(6122) (0.0795)
Govt – – 0.0750
(0.1458)
Real tax per 1000 HH – 0.725** 0.0853**
(0.0346) (0.0039)
Real GDP per capita – – -0.0022
-(0.0021)
N 24 24 24
R2 0.265 0.744 0.764
Prob[F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5 Estimated income inequality for Portugal, 1565–1770 (Theil index). Sources: see Table 3 and
text
Benchmark Total inequality Within groups Between groups
1565 1.336 0.797 0.539
1700 0.775 0.737 0.039
1770 0.978 0.919 0.058
25 Morrisson (2000) includes several national studies covering significant time spans, but they are shorter
and encompass mainly the period of industrialisation. However, a few have covered similar or longer
intervals—Alfani (2015); Ryckbosch (2016); Van Zanden (1995).
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4 Why did early modern Portugal become more equal?
In the pre-industrial history of income distribution, Portugal represents a singular
case. For over two hundred years, its permanent decline in inequality stands in stark
contrast with the rise in this parameter in the many other countries which have been
submitted to similar scrutiny. Consistently, the general view on the latter has been
that ‘during the early modern period, inequality grew everywhere’ (Alfani 2015:
2).26 The question this poses is whether Portugal simply reacted differently to the
same forces present in other countries, or, instead, responded ‘normally’ but to
different forces. In these final pages, we try and show that the correct answer was
largely the second of these alternatives.
The new literature on early modern inequality, to which this article belongs, has
tried to establish a unified explanation that would account for all national income
and wealth disparities and their variation. Its principal goal has been to set up causal
frameworks that will fit together a variety of distributional outcomes with the
specific circumstances of each place and moment. A legacy has gradually emerged
from this collective effort at theorizing inequality and can by now be summed up in
a set of four propositions.
The first one was suggested by Kuznets in a celebrated article in 1955.27 The
proposal was that when an economy started to undergo ‘modern economic growth’,
output per capita rose and labour productivity increased and spread out differentially
across the board. The work force shared in these gains differentially too and
experienced compositional shifts which together originated the income disparities
that we are seeking to explain. In early modern economies, on the other hand, not
much of this dynamism was displayed. In the very few ‘core’ ones that did,
however, one may come across a positive, stable relationship between income
inequality and variation in economic structure and GDP per capita, as Van Zanden
(1995) maintained he did in Holland and later in Britain.
The second—a so-called Williamson effect28—concerns a state of development
in which a rising demand for skills and qualifications results from a sustained
process of economic growth and development. A share of the labour force should
end up in receipt of ever-rising premia on this account, as the production of the
desired amount of human capital is continually challenged by the skill scarcities
induced by the pace of economic transformation. In this case, the effect of economic
inequality shifts would be concentrated at the level of the labour force and be
closely dependent on human capital production.
The third hypothesis has its lineage in the ‘classical economists’. It claims that
what drove distributional alterations were supervening modifications in the
26 Practically every study in this field has concluded in a similar vein. Hoffman et al. (2002) find that:
‘inequality within the nations of western Europe has risen greatly’ (p. 324). This is echoed by Van Zanden
(1995): ‘a super Kuznets curve spanning many centuries […] was characterized by rising inequality’ (p.
662). Ryckbosch (2016: 1) speaks of ‘a clear growth in economic inequality in the two centuries prior to
the industrial revolution’.
27 Kuznets (1955). The present description of these four hypotheses can be followed in two excellent
summaries by Van Zanden (1995) and Ryckbosch (2016).
28 Invoked by Van Zanden (1995) and Ryckbosch (2016).
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functional distribution of income, i.e., how output was shared between the factors of
production (Ryckbosch 2016). The question then becomes—what propelled these
modifications? The starting point was an original, stable combination of production
factors, the division of which had then to evolve in response to readjustments over
time in the original relation between them. In some situations, this re-distributional
exercise was driven by ‘the power and position of the various social groups’, i.e.,
landowners or capitalists, to the detriment of labour (Van Zanden 1995: 661). In
other, more advanced, capitalised economies such imbalances were propelled by the
acceleration of urban capital accumulation in the hands of a few. In the majority of
cases, it was the result of Malthusian population pressures, which led to a decline in
the land–labour ratio. In the absence of technological shocks, a fall in labour
productivity and real wages ensued and caused a mounting spread between the
earnings accruing to land and those accruing to labour. Obviously, given the
predominance in the economy of these two factors, the long-run implication of this
scenario was a rise in economic inequality overall (Be´rtola et al. 2010).
Our fourth premise deals with the impact of institutions in the broadest sense. It is
the one which takes us closest to considering exogenous factors as determinants of
long-run income disparities. It is also the one which is hardest to handle in terms of
quantification and the exact specification of the variables considered. It has
nevertheless been usefully invoked by several studies (Van Zanden 1995; Milanovic
et al. 2011; Alfani 2015) even if, for the time being, its implementation has tended
to be of a residual and speculative nature.
To establish which of these forces provides the best interpretation for the long-
run change in Portugal’s distribution, we need first to sketch the relevant features of
its early modern economy. Recent research based on an extensive new database
rejects the traditional image of a stagnant and impoverished country (Palma and
Reis 2016). Instead, it documents intensive growth between 1550 and 1750, in the
course of which real GDP per capita almost doubled. This was supported essentially
by the primary sector, though after 1700 also by burgeoning gains from colonial
exploitation. Two major technical changes in agriculture were decisive. One was the
largest ‘maize revolution’ in Europe from the early 1600s, which replaced to a large
extent the production and consumption of wheat and rye by this far more effective
crop. The other was the rise, from the late 1600 s, of an export-oriented high-quality
wine sector with a virtual monopoly in the buoyant British market until late in the
eighteenth century. Both were highly labour-intensive, which led to a significant
‘agro-industrious revolution’—between 1600 and 1800 the supply of labour per
capita increased by 50%—though not to a profound re-structuring of the economy.
In this respect, Portugal contrasted with what was meanwhile happening in the two
economic leaders of Europe in the late early modern period (Broadberry et al. 2015;
Van Zanden and Van Leuween 2012).
Thanks to freshly minted metrics, it is now feasible to test quantitatively our case
study regarding the propositions outlined above. Given Portugal’s quite vigorous
long-term performance, we use three yardsticks to explore the first of the questions
raised above. Figure 4 displays the shares of urban population and non-agricultural
labour alongside our three inequality benchmarks. In a presumed situation of
Kuznetsian labour shifts, from low-paid, ‘traditional’ occupations to better paid,
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‘modern’ sector jobs, the expectation would be that the first two variables should
vary positively with changes in inequality. In fact, they did not. The urban
population share did not vary at all until 1700 and only very little thereafter. At the
same time, the non-agricultural labour-share marker also behaved in the opposite
way to what one might suppose. The failure of the model is equally brought out by
Fig. 5, which shows a persistent mismatch between per capita GDP and the
inequality trend. A reasonable explanation for both explanatory difficulties is that in
this epoch growth could occur, but often did not generate significant structural
change and this rendered this kind of distributional impact less likely.
Harnessing a ‘Williamson effect’ to the present analysis may be expected to run
into similar difficulties. Weak structural modifications would again be the principal
cause. To verify this assertion, we make use of two more new indicators for
Portugal—a ratio of skilled-to-unskilled wages and another comparing the salaries
of non-manual, essentially urban occupations with the wages of manual unskilled
workers. They are presented, respectively, in Figs. 6 and 7, and provide elucidation
for our question. Over the long run, the highest paid and most skilled or qualified
benefitted least from changes in demand for human capital attributes.29 Given the
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29 In Holland and in particular the Dutch cities, the exact opposite occurred. See Van Zanden (1995).
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urban nature of these mid-range occupations and the slow rate of the country’s
urbanization, this should come as no surprise. The relative scarcity of mostly rural,
raw labour on which we are basing our analysis kept its earnings at least abreast or
even ahead of those of the qualified workers with better paid jobs which this society
seemingly overproduced.
We now turn to shifts in the distribution of functional income, the most
promising angle for the question this paper poses. The theoretical background is the
Malthusian model. Here the prime features are ‘relatively stagnant real wages and
per capita output’ and ‘an increasing population [which] pressed on a quasi-fixed
land endowment, to the benefit of landlords’ (O’Rourke and Williamson 2005: 6).
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This has a considerable relevance for the topic of inequality. In an agrarian economy
like Portugal’s, where the majority lived off the land, a large share of national
product accrued to the agricultural sector and was divided among cultivators and
landholders. This division was determined principally by population pressure, which
governed the size of the land–labour ratio, and by the evolution of the social and
legal conditions that shaped access to natural resources. Combined, these were the
crucial influences on the distribution of the nation’s income.
In the canonical Malthusian model, a rising population like that of Portugal, and
indeed Europe, would imply increasing land scarcity, a rising rent–wage ratio and
escalating inequality. In fact, as Fig. 8 demonstrates, the trend was the opposite. A
rising shortage of land—the land–labour ratio fell to half between 1550 and 1750—
was accompanied, at first sight strangely, by a falling rent–wage ratio and greater
overall distributional equality, except for the end of the period when inequality
picked up a little, in step with an increase in the rent–wage ratio. This is not,
however, the paradox it might appear to be. The reason is the remarkable
transformation of the primary sector towards a new and increasingly labour-
intensive agriculture, which was able therefore to absorb significantly larger
amounts of labour and sustain a more equitable repartition of earnings. This is
something that most contemporary economies were not able to do and consequently
the reason why, in contrast with Portugal, they endured rising inequality.
Although indubitably of great importance, institutional factors have not yet
established a strong analytic position in the dispute over the determinants of
national income inequality profiles. The key concept here is extractiveness, a
capacity displayed by the state or by powerful groups protected by it, to obtain
additional income for themselves by means other than market forces (Milanovic
et al. 2011). In research on early modern Portugal, this problematic has followed
two lines of enquiry. One of them focuses on variations over time in the power of
landed, noble families or Church institutions to enlarge estates forcefully or raise
larger payments from the cultivators of the soil. Neither of the two camps opposing
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each other over this issue has as yet convincingly shown in which direction this
potential contribution to economic inequality actually went.30
The second line concentrates on the state, a protagonist with far more complex
motivations and outcomes—military, territorial, political and economic. Putting all
of this together during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Portugal, the
balance may well have inclined to the side of a more equal distribution. Military
endeavours on the whole were not intense drivers of expenditure that required
heavier taxes.31 Wars were few and relatively low-cost. From the middle of the
seventeenth century, the protection of the empire was partly defrayed by Britain,
who guarded overseas maritime lanes. By the eighteenth century, substantial
colonial revenues were alleviating the fiscal burden on the home country, while
royal patronage in the empire kept the nobility on a short leash and discouraged
excesses at home against the peasantry (Costa et al. 2016). In Portugal, it would
seem that the greater and the lesser landlords depended for their livelihood
considerably on a monarch who did not wish or need more extraction. This is,
something, however, which still awaits further study.
5 Conclusion
This article uses a substantial new database to estimate economic inequality in
Portugal on three different occasions in the early modern period—1565, 1700 and
1770. It comprises circa 140,000 households in twenty-seven observations across
the country. In terms of content, the aim is to fill a gap in a flourishing literature with
a little studied case and thus further the possibilities of comparative analysis in this
field. In terms of method, its most important contribution is to show that long-term
economic inequality and macroeconomic performance have much to gain from
being researched jointly.
Several important steps had to be taken from the outset. One was to select a
national measure in the spirit of Kuznets, rather than a regional or local one. A
second was to calculate an index of income disparity which represented a ‘cleaner’
approach than one based on wealth. The third was to employ the best possible data,
which was done by using, to a large extent, a set of precocious personal income tax
rolls, complemented by a smaller and earlier set of taxes on rents. The fourth was to
use a Theil rather than a Gini index so as to avoid problems of decomposition,
which arise with the latter metric.
A parsimonious approach was followed since it would have been impossible to
cover directly the entire country and all the years in the period under observation. It
was also an ‘additive strategy’, which built up from four types of settlement, each
one assumed to have stable inequality characteristics. For each benchmark,
representatives of each of these types were then aggregated into weighted means to
30 For examples, see Neto (1997), on the one hand, and Salvado (2010), on the other.
31 Alfani (2015) shows how building up and unifying a military Piedmontese state in the sixteenth
century forced the monarch to become more extractive.
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obtain a national Theil for every benchmark. All the data employed were checked
for reliability, plausibility and biases.
The results were unexpected. They portray a downward sloping inequality profile
which, as far as we know, to date has no equal in early modern European history.
Thus far, all case studies have reported long-run rising inequality and, puzzlingly,
this happens in conjunction, sometimes with growing economies, other times with
stagnant or receding ones. To unravel this enigma, recourse was had to the four
standard hypotheses that are usually followed in trying to explain the determinants
of economic disparity. Three rely on quantitative tests; the fourth is descriptive and
naturally less exact.
The best fit was provided by analysing factor–price ratios. It was found that
between 1565 and 1770, a rent–wage index for Portugal, which proxies the relative
scarcity of land and labour, tracked quite well the evolution of the inequality index.
A test for the ‘Williamson effect’ yielded a somewhat weaker result but pointed in
the same direction. The Kuznets model lacked explanatory power and an
institutional approach appeared to corroborate the favoured methodology.
In terms of this era of European history, this outcome may seem inconsistent with
the sustained demographic pressures which should have caused the opposite trend.
The singularity, in this case, can be explained by a long wave of agriculture-based
economic expansion during which the demand for labour mostly ran ahead of that
for land. The highly labour-intensive type of cultivation that spread after 1600 and
went on for a century and a half helps to explain this continuous absorption of
labour without Malthusian effects. As a result, Portugal’s fast growing population
was able not only to enjoy a rising secular standard of living, but additionally to live
for generations under conditions of declining inequality.
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